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University ofMissouri
or more than four decades, corporate law
scholars have debated whether government
should prohibit insider trading, commonly
defined as stock trading on the basis of mate-
rial, nonpublic information. Participants in
this long-running debate have generally
assumed that trading that decreases a stock's
price should be treated the same as trading that causes the price
to rise: either both forms of trading should be regulated or nei-
ther should. I argue for a middle-ground position in which
"price-decreasing insider trading" (sales, short sales, and pur-
chases of put options on the basis of negative information) is
deregulated, while "price-increasing insider trading" (purchases
of stock and call options on the basis of positive information)
remains restricted.
The reason for the proposed asymmetric treatment is
that price-decreasing insider trading provides significantly
more value to investors than price-increasing insider trading.
Price-decreasing insider trading provides an effective means
of combating the problem of overvalued equity - i.e., a stock
price so high that it cannot be justified by expected future
earnings. As Harvard's Michael Jensen has argued, overval-
ued equity increases the probability that corporate man-
agers will engage in value-destroying actions. Deregulation
of price-decreasing insider trading would allow corporate
insiders - those in the best position to know when a stock
is overvalued - to signal the market that the price is too high.
Deregulation of price-increasing insider trading could sim-
ilarly remedy undervalued equity, but undervaluation caus-
es fewer problems than overvaluation and there are numer-
ous other mechanisms for addressing that sort of mispricing.
Moreover, the potential investor losses resulting from price-
increasing insider trading are higher than those caused by
price- decreasing trading.
Thomas A. Lambert is associate professor of law at the University of Missouri.
This article draws on the author's paper "Overvalued Equity and the Case for an
Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime," Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 41(2006).
THE INSIDER TRADING DEBATE
Ever since Henry Manne published his classic book Insider
Trading and the Stock Market, scholars have debated whether
insider trading has net benefits. Critics of insider trading
attribute to it both distributional and efficiency costs. The main
distributional claim is that there is something fundamentally
wrong with traders using an informational advantage to prof-
it at the expense of other traders, particularly when the advan-
raged traders are corporate insiders who are supposed to be act-
ing as agents for those who lack the informational advantage.
As for efficiency costs, the critics make several claims:
m Insider trading discourages equity investment by unin-
formed outsiders because they fear trading with
informed insiders, which reduces the liquidity of capi-
tal markets.
m Insider trading encourages insiders to delay disclo-
sures and to make management decisions that
increase share price volatility but do not maximize
firm value.
m Insider trading increases the "bid-ask" spread of stock
specialists, who systematically lose on trades with
insiders (whom they cannot identify ex ante) and who
will thus tend to "insure" against such losses by charg-
ing a small premium on each trade.
m Banning insider trading protects the corporation's
property rights over valuable information regarding
firm prospects.
Proponents of deregulating insider trading discount those
arguments. Regarding the normative claim that insider trad-
ing is simply wrong, they argue that insider trading cannot be
cc unfair" to investors because they trade with full knowledge
of the possibility of insider trading. The proponents dismiss
the efficiency criticisms with a mixture of empirical evidence
and theory. With respect to concerns that insider trading
increases bid-ask spreads, empirical evidence suggests that any
increases are small. While in theory the ability to engage in
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insider trading might encourage managers to delay disclosures
or make management decisions aimed solely at increasing
share price volatility, deregulation advocates contend such
mismanagement is unlikely. They observe that managers gen-
erally work in teams and the theoretical mismanagement
described by ban proponents would require the explicit uneth-
ical collusion of many managers, which is unlikely. Finally,
deregulation proponents assert that a corporate "property
right" to material nonpublic information need not be a non-
transferable interest granted to the corporation; efficiency
considerations may call for the right to be transferable and/or
.c. ,4.
initially allocated to a different party (e.g., to insiders).
In addition to rebutting the arguments for regulation,
proponents of deregulation have offered affirmative argu-
ments for liberalizing insider trading. First, they maintain that
insider trading should generally be permitted because it
increases stock market efficiency (i.e., the degree to which
stock prices reflect fundamental value), which promotes effi-
cient resource allocation. Corporate insiders, after all, generally
know more about their company's prospects than anyone else.
When they purchase or sell their company's stock, thereby bet-
ting their own money that the stock is mispriced, they con-
vey valuable information to the marketplace. Assuming their
trades somehow become public, other rational investors will
likely follow their lead, which will cause stock prices to reflect
more accurately the underlying value of the firm. More effi-
cient stock prices will then lead to a more efficient allocation
of productive resources throughout the economy.
Deregulation advocates further maintain that corpora-
tions ought to be allowed to adopt liberal insider trading
policies because competition in the labor and capital markets
will lead corporations to adopt efficient insider trading poli-
cies. The market for managerial labor may reward corporations
with liberal insider trading policies because the right to make
money through insider trading is valuable to potential man-
agers. But capital market pressures will prevent corporations
from adopting insider trading policies that are, on balance,
harmful to investors. Thus, deregulation advocates maintain,
the interaction of the labor and capital markets will incentivize
firms to adopt insider trading policies that are, on the whole,
value-maximizing.
Not surprisingly, the affirmative case for liberalizing insid-
er trading has not gone unchallenged. Ban defenders retort
that trading by insiders conveys information only to the
extent it is revealed, and even then the message it conveys is
"noisy" or ambiguous. Insiders may trade for a variety of rea-
sons, many of which are unrelated to their possession of
inside information. Ban defenders further maintain that
insider trading is an inefficient, clumsy, and possibly perverse
compensation mechanism.
One of the most striking aspects of the well-worn insider
trading debate is its starkness. Assuming that insider trading
must be treated as a whole, ban defenders and opponents have
argued over liberalization in all-or-nothing terms; they have
not considered whether some species of insider trading should
be treated differently than others.
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This article attempts to demonstrate that price-decreasing
insider trading, which consists of trading by insiders on the
basis of negative nonpublic information, provides greater
net benefits to investors than price-increasing insider trading,
which consists of trading by insiders on the basis of positive
nonpublic information. Accordingly, the law should treat
price-decreasing insider trading less harshly than price-
increasing insider trading.
PERSISTENCE OF OVERVALUATION
Stock overvaluation is more likely to persist than underval-
uation and tends to cause greater harm to investors when it
occurs. Accordingly, insider trading that reduces the price of
overvalued equity toward fundamental value will provide
greater investor benefits than will insider trading that increas-
es stock prices.
Empirical evidence suggests that the bulk of securities mis-
pricing occurs in the direction of overvaluation rather than
undervaluation. This should not be surprising because the two
groups of individuals most likely to provide the information
that would correct stock mispricing - corporate managers and
professional stock analysts - are more likely to emphasize pos-
itive than negative information about future corporate prof-
its. Let us consider these two groups, to see why this would be.
CORPORATE MANAGERS Scholars have argued that corporate
managers, seeking to protect their reputations for trustwor-
thiness, have a tendency toward candor. But there are numer-
ous reasons to believe that managers tend to be systematically
optimistic in their portrayals of their corporations' prospects and
thus are less likely to correct overpricing than underpricing.
First, corporate managers may fail to be forthcoming with
stock price- correcting bad news because they face "last peri-
od" and "multiple audience" problems. The last period prob-
lem exists when the undisclosed news is so bad that it might
cause insolvency or some kind of managerial shake-up. If
senior managers think the undisclosed bad news will result
in company insolvency or employment demotion or termi-
nation, they may rationally decide that the costs to them of
misleading disclosures (or omissions) are less than the costs
to them of candor. The multiple audience problem results
from the fact that corporate managers cannot make target-
ed disclosures of negative information only to shareholders.
When managers make a corporate disclosure, they inform not
only shareholders, but also such corporate constituencies as
consumers, employees, and suppliers. Managers may wish
to conceal price-decreasing information in order to protect
relationships with those constituencies, despite the man-
agers' interest in maintaining a reputation for candor.
Well-documented cognitive biases may also lead managers
to overemphasize good news. Individuals unconsciously con-
strue information and events in a manner that confirms
their prior beliefs, attitudes, and impressions. Corporate
managers may strongly resist evidence that previously select-
ed courses of action were ill-chosen. In addition, managers
may be falsely optimistic because they officially "control"
corporate endeavors. Psychologists have concluded that indi-
viduals systematically overrate their own abilities and achieve-
ments. Thus, corporate managers overestimate the chances of
success of the businesses under their control.
The incentives faced by lower-level managers and workers
exacerbate the good-news bias of senior executives. Each
information-provider will be tempted to tweak his message to
conform to his self-interest. By the time the price-affecting
information reaches the senior managers in charge of cor-
porate disclosure, it is likely to have been "massaged" so as to
make underlings look good.
Finally, even if corporate managers were as likely to perceive
overvaluation as undervaluation and were equally motivated
to correct both forms of mispricing, they would be more like-
ly to correct undervaluation than overvaluation because they
can do so more easily. Consider a manager confronted with evi-
dence that her company is undervalued. She might issue a press
release explaining why the market was undervaluing her firm,
or she could initiate a stock repurchase, thereby signaling
management's strong belief that the stock is undervalued.
Managers finding undervalued equity to be a chronic problem
could adopt equity-based compensation schemes for executives
(e.g., payment in stock or stock options).
A manager confronting overvalued equity, by contrast, has
few effective options. As a practical matter, managerial candor
is not an option because a manager who directly announces to
the market that his corporation's stock is overpriced probably
would not remain employed for very long. Nor could the man-
ager correct the mispricing by engaging in a sale transaction
that would send the reverse signal of a stock repurchase. The
signal sent by a stock buy-back is relatively unambiguous. In
contrast, a sale transaction designed to signal overvaluation (e.g.,
an equity offering or a sale of treasury shares the corporation
previously purchased) is much noisier. It could easily be inter-
preted as a means of raising capital for some sort of corporate
undertaking. And, of course, equity-based compensation, which
helps prevent undervaluation, exacerbates overvaluation by
inducing managers to drive the share price higher even when
they know the company is overvalued. There is thus an asym-
metry in the degree to which managers and market forces are
able to correct the different species of mispricing: the primary
options available to correct negative mispricing are not prac-
tically available when the mispricing is in the positive direction.
STOCK ANALYSTS Stock analysts, the other individuals who are
well-positioned to identify and correct stock mispricing, also
are less likely to correct overvaluation than undervaluation.
Consider the optimism bias exhibited in the Enron debacle.
In the autumn of 2001, just weeks before Enron's December
2, 2001 bankruptcy, each of the 15 largest Wall Street firms
covering Enron's stock had buy recommendations in place.
And as late as October 26, 2001 - after Enron's chief finan-
cial officer had been forced to resign, the SEC had initiated an
investigation, and the Wall StreetJournal had run several sto-
ries about Enron's earnings management problems - 10 of
the 15 largest Wall Street firms covering Enron maintained
buy recommendations, as did 15 of 17 top Wall Street analysts
surveyed by Thompson Financial/First Call. Sadly, Enron
46 REGULATION WINTER 2009-2010
was no outlier. The ratio of buy to sell recommendations
has recently been as high as 100-to-1, and in the period imme-
diately preceding a 60 percent drop in the NASDAQ, only 0.8
percent of analysts' recommendations were sell or strong
sell. Thus, the evidence suggests that analysts, quick to report
undervaluation by issuing buy recommendations, are less
responsive to mispricing in the positive direction.
Empirical evidence suggests that analysts' employers have
structured their promotion and compensation schemes to
favor overvaluation. Harrison Hong and Jeffrey Kubik, for
example, analyzed the earnings forecasts and employment his-
tories of 12,000 analysts working for 600 brokerage houses
between 1983 and 2000. They found that analysts were sys-
tematically rewarded for being optimistic as long as the opti-
mism was within a range of accuracy that maintained the cred-
ibility of the analysts. Hong and Kubik also found that
relatively optimistic analysts were much less likely to be fired
or to leave a top brokerage house, were much more likely to
be hired by a better house, and were given better assignments
than their more pessimistic (realistic?) colleagues. Thus, ana-
lysts face personal incentives to issue enthusiastic and opti-
mistic recommendations, and are not likely to provide
investors with the "bad news" necessary to correct instances
of overvalued equity.
OVERVALUATION AND INVESTOR HARM
Not only is overvaluation more likely than undervaluation to
occur and persist, it also tends to cause greater harm to
investors. Perhaps most importantly, overvaluarion creates
much larger agency costs than undervaluation. Agency costs are
the sum of the contracting, monitoring, and bonding costs
incurred to reduce the conflicts of interest between principals
and agents, plus the residual loss that occurs because it is gen-
erally impossible to perfectly harmonize the behavior of agents
with the interests of their principals. While capital markets gen-
erally operate as a powerful tool for minimizing agency costs
(because firms that have developed effective mechanisms for
lowering such costs will be most attractive to investors), recent
economic developments suggest that, when equity becomes
overvalued, securities markets tend to exacerbate agency costs.
Before examining why overvaluation creates substantial
agency costs, consider why undervaluation does not do so.
When a firm's equity is undervalued, the incentives of share-
holders and managers are likely to be closely aligned: both
groups will usually want to increase the stock price toward
fundamental value. Shareholders prefer that result because
price appreciation increases their long-term wealth and
enhances the corporation's overall health (and thus its value)
by making it easier for the firm to raise funds in the capital
markets. Managers also prefer to increase share price because
a higher stock price enhances their job prestige and (most like-
ly) their compensation, and enables the corporation to be
more flexible (because it can use its high-priced stock as cur-
rency or raise more money for expansion in the capital mar-
kets). Given the overlap in shareholders' and managers' inter-
ests, it is unlikely that undervaluation results in managerial
behavior that diverges from shareholder interests.
In contrast, when a firm's stock is overvalued, the interests
of shareholders and managers are likely to diverge substan-
tially. Managers are unlikely to prefer that the stock price fall
to fundamental value because they receive benefits from a
high stock price. While most managers realize that overval-
nation cannot last forever and that price correction is likely
to occur eventually, they are unlikely to take steps to reduce
price to fundamental value. Their tendencies toward optimism
push them to believe either that they can eventually cause the
firm to generate cash flows that will justify the currently
inflated price or that they will be able to exit the corporation
(by resigning their positions and selling their stock) prior to
the inevitable price correction.
On first glance, one might suppose that shareholders would
similarly prefer that equity overvaluation persist, after all, the
higher the stock price, the greater a shareholder's wealth.
Because overvaluation tends to be corrected eventually, however,
medium- to long-term shareholders generally cannot capture
the transitory wealth increase stemming from overvaluation
and thus will not care to extend periods of overvaluation.
While short-term shareholders may be able to profit from
transitory periods of overvaluation, they can do so only if they
sell their stock prior to the inevitable price correction. Such a
"bail before correction" strategy is much riskier for share-
holders than for managers because shareholders know little
about corporate events that may reveal overvaluation and are
thus more likely to delay too long before selling their stock.
Moreover, shareholders possess neither actual nor apparent con-
trol over the events likely to reveal overvaluation and will thus
tend to be less optimistic than managers about their ability to
sell their stock before the inevitable price correction.
Accordingly, even short-term stockholders will value periods of
overvaluation less than managers will.
In addition, any upside experienced by shareholders dur-
ing periods of overvaluation is likely to be offset by a signif-
icant downside: managers who seek to maintain stock prices
at artificially high levels tend to engage in value-destroying
actions. In order to protect their jobs and reputations, man-
agers of overvalued firms often need to "buy time" - i.e., to
trick the market into maintaining the high stock price until
they can exit the firm (both as shareholders and as man-
agers) or can produce the corporate performance required to
justify the stock price. Consider, for example, this account of
Enron's collapse from Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind's
2003 book The Smartest Guys in the Room:
Enron's accounting games were never meant to last
forever.... The goal was to maintain the impression
that Enron was humming until [CEO Jeff] Skilling's
next big idea kicked in and started raking in real prof-
its.... In Skilling's mind, though, there was no way he
was going to fail. He had always succeeded before, and
his successes had transformed the company. Why
would it be any different [this time]?
Such continued trickery requires beating analysts' expecta-
tions because the capital markets routinely punish firms
that fail to meet such expectations.
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The problem is that managers of overvalued firms cannot
perpetually meet analysts' expectations by exploiting legiti-
mate value-creating opportunities. Once those options have
been exhausted, managers will eventually turn to gimmicks
that are designed to produce numbers that appease the mar-
ket but actually reduce long-term firm value.
ACQUISITIONS Because corporate acquisitions create the
appearance of growth (and thus may fool the market for at
least a while), corporate managers who have exhausted other
growth options may find such acquisitions attractive, even
if they are ultimately value-reducing. Consider, for example,
recent findings by Sara Moeller, Frederick Schlingemann, and
Ren6 Stulz, who compared the effect of merger announce-
ments on the stock prices of acquiring firms during the
1998-2001 period, a period of significant equity overvalua-
tion, with the acquiring-firm price effects of merger
announcements in the 1980s. The authors discovered that,
for the 1998-2001 period, the value of acquiring firms
declined by a total of $240 billion in the three-day periods
surrounding announcements of acquisitions. During all of
the 1980s, by contrast, the loss in value of acquiring firms
during the three-day period surrounding merger announce-
ments was only $4.2 billion. While the acquirers' losses in the
1980s were offset by gains to acquirees for a net synergy
gain of $11.6 billion, such an offset did not occur in the
1998-2001 period; instead the losses to acquirers exceeded
acquirees' gains for a net synergy loss of $134 billion.
Equity overvaluation seems to have influenced this value
destruction. Most of the value losses were attributable to 87
"large loss" transactions in which the loss to each acquiring
firm exceeded $1 billion. "Wealth destruction on a massive
scale" appears to have occurred because overvalued bidders
used their high-priced stock to finance deals that, from an
investor's perspective, should not have been pursued.
INVESTMENTS Equity overvaluation also tends to destroy
firm value by leading managers to pursue certain greenfield
investments that have a negative net present value (NPv) and
to avoid other investments that have a positive NPV. When
equity is overvalued, firm managers effectively have more
capital to invest. Most obviously, they may pay for expens-
es using their firm's inflated stock as currency. In addi-
tion, they can raise more cash by issuing new equity at
prices reflecting their firm's overvaluation. Empirical data
indicate that managers do, in fact, take advantage of peri-
ods of overvaluation by issuing equity. Equity overvaluation
thus increases the resources with which managers may pur-
sue firm expansion, creating a version of what Jensen has
termed the "agency costs of free cash flow." Because firm
expansion often provides managers with private benefits
that are not available to shareholders (e.g., greater job pres-
tige, perhaps higher compensation), managers have an incen-
tive to pursue expansion beyond the value-maximizing point
- the point at which the corporation's marginal benefit cre-
ated equals its marginal cost of expansion. Overvalued equi-
ty exacerbates those agency costs by expanding the resources
with which managers may pursue firm expansion.
In addition to causing active value destruction through
imprudent acquisitions and unwise greenfield investments,
overvaluation may cause passive value destruction by encour-
aging managers to forgo positive NPV projects. Because the
dominant strategy of managers of overvalued firms is, in
Jensen's words, to "postpone the day of reckoning until
[they] are gone or [they] figure out how to resolve the issue,"
they will look for opportunities to conceal their firm's over-
valuation from the market. One way to do so is to delay
value-enhancing investment expenditures in order to meet
quarterly earnings expectations and avoid the value reassess-
ment that accompanies missing such an expectation.
Research suggests that this sort of value-sacrificing behav-
ior is widespread. In a recent survey, 80 percent of corporate
CFOs stated that they would be willing to delay discretionary
expenditures on research and development, advertising, and
maintenance in order to meet earnings expectations, and over
55 percent stated that they would "delay starting a new proj-
ect even if this entails a small sacrifice in value" in order to
meet a target.
PRICE-DECREASING INSIDER TRADING
In addition to providing greater investor benefits than price-
increasing insider trading, price-decreasing insider trading is
also likely to impose lower investor costs. To see why this is
so, consider how insider trading may cause harm to the cor-
poration and how the law affords asymmetric treatment to the
use of different types of secret information.
SQUANDERING OPPORTUNITIES The most plausible nega-
tive effect of insider trading is the thwarting of valuable cor-
porate transactions that could otherwise be accomplished.
Suppose, for example, that a mining corporation discovers a
valuable ore deposit and wishes to purchase surrounding
land. It will want to keep the ore discovery secret so as to pro-
cure a favorable price on the surrounding land. If insiders
aware of the discovery begin buying the corporation's stock,
thereby causing a precipitous price increase, landowners may
become suspicious and raise their price demands. Price-
increasing insider trading could thereby squander a corporate
opportunity.
Price-decreasing insider trading could also thwart value-
creating corporate transactions. The relevant situation would
be one in which the corporation had an interest in keeping its
stock's inflated price above its true value in order to accom-
plish some transaction. For example, the corporation might
desire to use its overvalued stock as consideration for a pur-
chase, to issue new equity at an inflated price, or to secure
credit on favorable terms. Price-decreasing insider trading
could squander such corporate opportunities.
VALUE VS. DEFECTS If both price-increasing and price-
decreasing insider trading have the potential to undermine
worthwhile corporate projects, why ban only the price-increas-
ing variety? The answer lies in the more general treatment of
secret information by the law.
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When it comes to a contracting party's use of secret infor-
mation in executing a deal, the law generally distinguishes
between secret "good news" (e.g., inside information about
hidden value) and secret "bad news" (e.g., inside information
about hidden defects). In order to encourage people to search
out hidden value, the law permits the use of the former type
of inside information, but it generally allows counter-parties
to void transactions that involve the use of the latter sort of
information. Thus, transactions involving the suppression of
information about overvaluation (hidden defects) are not
typically available to the corporation, but transactions involv-
ing suppression of information suggesting undervaluation
(hidden value) are.
The upshot is that price-decreasing insider trading, unlike
the price-increasing variety, generally cannot thwart otherwise
available corporate opportunities. Price-decreasing insider
trading thus imposes lower costs on investors.
CONCLUSION
Undervaluation is more likely to be self-correcting than over-
valuation. In the long run, undervaluation is unlikely to
impose significant costs on investors, while overvaluation is
likely to do so. Insider trading that pushes a stock's price
upward toward actual value may cause harm to the corpora-
tion and its investors. Insider trading that pushes an inflat-
ed price downward toward value is unlikely to do so.
Taken together, these observations suggest that an asym-
metric insider trading policy that permits some form of price-
decreasing insider trading, while generally banning price-
increasing insider trading, is the policy that investors and
managers would likely bargain for were they able (practical-
ly and legally) to do so. Accordingly, the law should liberalize
price-decreasing insider trading (subject only to contractual
restraints imposed by corporations themselves), while con-
tinuing to regulate price-increasing insider trading. I
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